Mr. President, Seamus Heaney, the Irish poet and Nobel

laureate, wrote lines that are destined for immortality:

We all long for that day when hope and history rhyme. But it is the

special province of statecraft to try to make that rhyme.

As such, one way to look at foreign policy is to determine if our

policies do rhyme with history or whether they represent the triumph of

hope over history. By history, I do not mean the strictly academic

variety. I mean the accumulation of insight and experience that we all

carry about. Perhaps it is better described as our rough sense of the

way the world works.

It is particularly interesting to pose these questions in light of

the Bush foreign policy since so much of it seems to spring from

ideological hope, from robust attempts to reshape the world along

predetermined lines.

Iraq, of course, is the crucial arena. It has been made so by the

administration.

Our immediate response to September 11 was to seek out and destroy

the terrorist apparatus that struck us. Our attack in Afghanistan was

aimed at the heart of al-Qaida and the rogue regime that provided it

sanctuary. We understood very painfully that we could not grant these

terrorists safe harbor. We had to act and we had to be prepared to act

preemptively to destroy al-Qaida. The threat was clear and in the

context of international terrorists like al-Qaida, the doctrine of

preemption was not only compelling but also inescapable.

Operation Enduring Freedom, the demolition of the Taliban regime, and

the disruption of the al-Qaida infrastructure represented a shrewd use

of military power to focus directly on an existential threat. The

history, again, using my very nontechnical definition, clearly shows

that al-Qaida could not be deterred and toleration would simply invite

further attack.

Ironically, having begun the destruction of al-Qaida in Afghanistan,

the administration quickly shifted its attention from the complete

destruction of the al-Qaida network to Iraq. Only in the past few weeks

has the Bush administration begun to realize that Afghanistan is far

from secure. They are redoubling their military and political efforts

to ensure that Afghanistan does not slide back into a failed state.

Still, the President's recent budget request only provides about $1

billion in funding for that effort, whereas commanders in the field

have said they will annually need $5 billion to ensure success.

Furthermore, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, and indeed

anywhere else, the Bush administration has never lost its preoccupation

with Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime.

Some may recall that in January of 1998, Secretary Rumsfeld,

Secretary Wolfowitz, and other prominent neoconservatives wrote to

President Clinton urging him to use military force to remove Saddam

Hussein. In their words:

This letter predated the attack on Iraq by 5 years. It predated

September 11 by more than 3 years.

With the publication of the first glimpses inside the Bush

administration, this preoccupation with Iraq becomes more obvious.

Former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill recounts that at the

first meeting of the National Security Council on January 30, 2001, the

discussion quickly vaulted over nagging issues of the conflict between

Israel and the Palestinian Authority and landed squarely on Iraq. In an

apparently scripted exchange, Condoleezza Rice and Vice President

Cheney and George Tenet not only led the discussion but also concluded

with an examination of grainy photos purporting to show what the CIA

thought was a plant producing chemical or biological materials for

weapons manufacture. According to O'Neill, ``ten days in, and it was

about Iraq.''

September 11 did not put Iraq in the administration's gunsights. It

was always there. It was there as a challenge, a personal one for the

President, and in the view of neoconservatives, it was there as an

opportunity to make hope and history rhyme.

But in focusing almost exclusively on Iraq, the administration, in my

view, disregarded a great deal of history. Again, I use the term

history colloquially. The justification for action was based more on

assumptions than evidence. The planning for their actions was based

more on hopes than experience. The end of the cold war and the demise

of the Soviet Union unshackled our military power so that we are

unbeatable in any conventional battle against any conventional foe.

However, it has not reversed a century in which empires collapsed and

foreign colonies began a troubled but independent road. Our military

power may be unchecked by any military adversary, but it is exercised

in a world that has come to distrust the unilateral use of force and

disbelief of the motives of those who wield such force.

The administration's insistence on an essentially unilateral approach

to confronting Iraq not only increased our effort both militarily and

economically, but it also defied the worldwide consensus that without

an immediate threat, the unilateral action of a great power against a

lesser state is a vanished aspect of the colonial epic.

Today, the United States is fervently trying to maintain the mantle

of liberator and avoid the label of occupier. In large part, this is

due to the overwhelming presence of the United States unleavened by a

broad array of allies or the significant presence of the United States

or United Nations or NATO in Iraq.

In contrast, multinational operations in places such as the Balkans

managed to avoid the stigma of occupation and insurgency for almost a

decade. A multilateral attack is not a talisman that will guarantee

success, but it is more congruent with a world that has rejected the

colonial solution in favor of multinational action.

The administration's rationale for a preemptive and virtually

unilateral operation against Iraq rested on a faithful devotion to

their preconceived notions and a strained reading of available

intelligence. One of the more thoughtful and evenhanded military

analysts, Anthony Cordesman, at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies has accurately summarized the record of the

administration's intelligence activities leading up to Operation Iraqi

Freedom.

In his words:

The administration did not use intelligence to help make a difficult

decision. It used intelligence to sell a preconceived notion. The long-

term fixed

view of the administration held that deterrence and international

inspectors were inherently incapable of containing Saddam. Only the

elimination of the regime could suffice. Moreover, regime change, in

their view, could have the added benefit of precipitating a

transformation of the entire region.

In effect, what the President and the administration did is present a

false dichotomy to the American people--two choices, when there are

many more. The two choices were: Attack Iraq or do nothing. In fact,

there are many other things we could have done and perhaps should have

done, including give the U.N. inspectors more time to search. They

might have come to the same conclusion that David Kay did: there are no

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We could have used not only the

legitimacy but also the cooperation of the United Nations if we had

pursued a course of diplomacy. But the President saw only two options:

Do nothing or attack Iraq.

Of course, we could not do nothing; indeed, we were not doing

nothing. We should have been actively engaged in containment, and not

just containment but enforcing the U.N. resolution with inspectors on

the ground. We should recall there were U.N. inspectors on the ground

inside Iraq and the administration, through their actions, had those

inspectors recalled prior to the inception of the military operations.

That is a result of this preoccupation with Saddam, the destruction of

his regime, the triumph of hope over history.

Then in planning for post-hostilities, the administration most

clearly let its hopes triumph over history. They bet that Iraqi

gratitude, together with a government of exiles, would provide for a

cheap and easy exit strategy. They ignored a history of antagonism

among the Sunni, the Shia, and the Kurds. They spoke of a rapidly

emerging democracy and market economy in Iraq, a country whose civic

life and social institutions had been suppressed for many years. They

insinuated exiles of dubious reputations, like Chalabi, who do not

command the respect of the Iraqi people. The administration entrusted

post-hostility planning to the Department of Defense, not for their

expertise, but for their ideological correctness.

One other aspect of the administration's hopes is that our operations

in Iraq would have a transformative effect on the region, if not the

world. They saw a democratic, market-oriented Iraq as an irresistible

attraction and example to the masses of Arabs who hunger for a better

way of life. Our success in Iraq would be emulated either by

enlightened leaders or rebellious streets. Since we have yet to succeed

in creating this new Iraq, it is hard to judge its transformative

value. In the very short run, the jury seems to be out.

Furthermore, our engagement in Iraq has limited our strategic

flexibility and narrowed our strategic focus. We are paying

insufficient attention to a place that is more likely than Iraq to

produce that dreaded intersection of ``nukes'' and terrorists; and that

place is North Korea.

We know the North Koreans have nuclear material and the ability to

make much more of it, if they have not done so already. Although there

does not appear to be any direct links between North Korea and al-Qaida

or other terrorist organizations, the North Koreans have a disturbing

history of weapons proliferation. Inept at economic development, they

have become too adept at trading dangerous weapons to stay afloat or as

a means to underscore their demands for international aid.

A few days ago, we concluded another round of international talks

with the North Koreans without any apparent breakthrough. As

encouraging as these discussions may seem, success--meaning the

complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear material and nuclear

weapons held by North Korea--can come, in my view, only with more

resolute and determined leadership by the President. To date, Iraq

seems to have monopolized the effective attention of the President and

his inner circle. Failure to resolve the situation in North Korea

through diplomacy will result in an intolerable situation that could

prompt the consideration of military action. A military option is not

appealing, and it may be extraordinarily difficult to carry out with

the current open-ended and demanding commitment to Iraq.

In addition, there has been little progress between the Israelis and

the Palestinians. In another regional problem area, the Iranians have

opened their nuclear program to more robust international inspection

but still refuse to moderate their domestic policies and their

international rhetoric. Indeed, the hardliners in Iran recently won an

election, giving them more clout and marginalizing the reformers within

that country, in the wake of our attack against Iraq.

Libya presents an interesting case. Our military success seems to

have focused their attention on repairing their relationship with the

West. One must be grateful any time a regime effectively renounces

weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, Qadhafi's actions seem more

like self-preservation than democratization. And, as previously

discussed, the ``shock and awe'' in Iraq did not influence the Afghanis

to be more cooperative. In fact, we lost ground in Afghanistan to

reconstituted insurgent forces. In the longer run, these hopes of

democratic reform and economic renewal in the region and throughout the

world will battle historic and cultural forces that may yield, but not

without a struggle and not without time.

There are signs that even the administration is coming to recognize

that history has overtaken some of their hopes. To minimize the stigma

of occupier, the Coalition Provisional Authority has accelerated the

transition to sovereignty with a target date of June 30, a date that is

more difficult to achieve with each passing day. It remains unclear who

they will be returning this sovereignty over to. An interim

constitution was adopted apparently today, but there is still a great

deal of uncertainty as to who will be the ruling authority and

ultimately how this sovereignty will be passed--truly passed--to the

Iraqi people.

In recognition of the economic reality of Iraq, the CPA has quietly

shelved plans to privatize the Iraqi economy, plans they had initially.

Now this would be a wrenching exercise in unemployment since almost

every Iraqi directly or indirectly seems to work for a state industry

or governmental entity.

The CPA is also deferring serious land reform in a country where land

was expropriated from traditional owners and bestowed upon supporters

of Saddam. The CPA also seems quietly poised to allow the Kurds to

develop an autonomous region under a loose federation, belying the

initial commitment to a fully integrated Iraqi state. And still

outstanding is whether the Shia majority will ultimately accept the

governing arrangements for the new Iraq.

And, having assumed the burden of Iraq, none of these recent

pragmatic adjustments are themselves without great dangers. A hasty

transfer of sovereignty could lead to a government without legitimacy

or one that quickly morphs into a religious and authoritarian regime

that does not share our enthusiasm for democracy. This political

process becomes an inviting target for insurgents who see disorder as

their key ally. Leaving economic restructuring to the Iraqis is

probably leaving it undone. Allowing the Kurds to create an autonomous

or semiautonomous region will cause consternation within Turkey while

adding to the difficulties of the new central government in Baghdad.

This administration has committed the Nation to operations in Iraq.

And we cannot fail. Let me emphasize that again. We cannot fail. But we

need to recognize that these ideological preoccupations that have led

us to Iraq have very real costs. We are spending approximately $4

billion a month to continue our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the

bulk of it being spent in Iraq. These costs do not include the

heartbreaking loss of American service men and women.

One must question a strategy in which you cannot afford to fail, but

you may not win anything. But, questioning aside, one has little choice

but to support our forces in the field and insist upon a more pragmatic

approach.

First, the administration must increase the overall size of our land

forces, not temporarily, but in anticipation of a long deployment in

both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Last fall, I was able to propose an amendment with my colleague,

Chuck Hagel, to increase the size of our Army by 10,000 soldiers. It

passed on the floor of the Senate but was stripped out of the

conference report at the insistence of the administration. They, at

that point, failed to recognize the need for more military personnel.

Since that time, the administration has indicated that they now

recognize a need for additional forces in the Army. But they still

continue to insist that it can be paid for out of supplemental

appropriations.

I believe we have to prepare for a long stay in Iraq. These new

military personnel should be paid for through the budget process, not

supplemental appropriations here and there on an irregular basis.

I believe also that in addition to increasing our overall end

strength, the administration must increase the number of forces in Iraq

and direct those forces to the protection of the Iraqi people, not just

to hunt for insurgents. Today, the greatest threat to the successful

reconstruction of Iraq is the rampant violence that engulfs the

country. Only a small portion of this violence is directed against

American forces. The greatest portion is directed against the Iraqi

people, creating a daily climate of violence facing every Iraqi which

saps their will to remake their country and support our efforts.

Today is a prime example. Over 140 Shiites were killed when bombs

exploded in Karbala and Baghdad during a religious holy day. However,

the Department of Defense still stubbornly clings to the proposition

that more American troops won't help. Rather, they claim that

indigenous Iraqi security forces are the answer. So they have created,

mostly on paper, Iraqi security forces that are inadequate and

insufficient for the critical months ahead.

``Iraqization'' has dim echoes of ``Vietnamization.'' Both are

political responses to real security problems. One failed; the other is

of dubious value at the moment.

Secondly, the administration must candidly and promptly acknowledge

the huge costs that are necessary to pursue our international

objectives. The recently submitted Presidential budget does not include

any funds for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President is

attempting to rely on previous supplemental appropriations until the

election. Recently, the chiefs of the Army, the Marine Corps, and the

Air Force admitted they would run out of funds on October 1 for

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently, reports have

surfaced that the services may indeed run out of these funds sooner

than that. They are now robbing Peter to pay Paul as they scavenge

other accounts to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to funding for our military forces directly, we should

understand even at the most optimal success level, military forces will

buy you time to deal with the more fundamental problems that cause

terrorism, that cause unstable governments, unstable regions. Those

costs are also huge: costs in economic development assistance, costs in

educational assistance. Those costs have to be factored in also. They

are not included effectively or sufficiently in the budget the

President sent to us.

As I said, this is not only poor budget policy with regard to

military forces, but if we cannot even honestly budget for military

operations, how can we marshal the will and the dollars to reinforce

military success with the resources for economic development that will

address the root causes of the animosity we are confronting.

One measure of the wisdom of any strategy is whether that strategy is

sustainable. The administration's choice of a virtually unilateral

preemptive attack followed by long-term and expensive nation building

is not a strategy that can be easily duplicated. It is especially

difficult to sustain without broad-based international support.

Ironically, our preoccupation with Iraq might serve as an inhibition as

we confront other adversaries. Moreover, our military advantages simply

buy us time, precious time, to deal with fundamental issues that create

the climate in which terrorism thrives.

Our attention to these issues of education and economic development

is necessary now and not just in Iraq. These, too, are expensive

undertakings that require international cooperation with strong

American leadership. We face great challenges around the world and here

at home. But Americans are not strangers to great challenges. We will

endure. And with wisdom and courage, we will prevail--the courage we

witness every day in the extraordinary valor of our fighting forces.

But the challenges before us require a strategic vision grounded on

attention to the compelling threats we face, not the ideological

impulses that stir our hearts. These challenges can best be faced with

other nations, not alone. These challenges require huge resources and a

long-term commitment, not budgetary gimmicks in the short run.

Until the administration acts on these basic principles, our response

to real threats will be hobbled by ideology rather than focused by

experience.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.